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RIGHTS OF DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS TO
APPRAISAL AND PAYMENT*
IRVING J. LEvYt

The corporation of a century ago was radically different from
the corporation of today. A closely knit organization, in which
the few shareholders took an active interest, it resembled in many
respects the ordinary partnership. But with the general expansion
of commercial enterprise, the corporation underwent fundamental
changes, and the rules which the common law had developed to
regulate a simple form of business organization in a simple society
became unsuited for the complex organism the corporation had become.
Thus, unanimous consent of the stockholders was in most jurisdictions necessary for the sale of all the assets of a solvent corporation,' to effect a consolidation or merger, 2 to bring about a
4
3
change in the nature of the business, or in the financial structure.
These restrictions on the majority were serious hindrances to the
sweeping reorganizations in structure which modem needs had
made the order of the day. Add to the trouble and delay of calling
stockholders' meetings of companies of numerous and widely spread
membership the difficulty of attaining unanimity on any proposition, and the hamper which this rule put on corporate development
becomes apparent.
This situation called for statutory aid, which was liberally given,
with the result that in most states, and especially in those where
*This paper is intended as a comparative study of the remedy with a view to
suggesting changes in the existing statutes on the subject. For an analysis of
the New York statutory provisions, see Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Storkholders (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 547. The rights of non-assenting shareholders in
case of amendments of corporate charters is considered at length by Professor
E. M. Dodd in Dissenting Shareholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters
(1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 584.
tMember of the New York Bar; Fellow in Law, Columbia University.
'Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. Ch. 578 (N. Y. 1861); Kean v.
Johnson, 9 N. J. Eq. 4oi (1853); Meyerhoff v. Banker's Securities, 147 Atl. 1o5
(N. J. Ch. 1929); Theis v. Spokane Gas Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004 (1904).
But see Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 73 Mass. 393 (i386); Bowditch v. Jackson, 76 N. H. 357, 82 Atl. 1014 (1912); Warren, Transfers of Corporate Undertakings (1917) 3o HARv. L. REv. 335; (1929) 14 MINN. L. Rlv. 58.
2
Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. 209 (1920).
Natusch v. Irving, to be found in Gow, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (3d ed. 1830),
Appendix, Item No. VI.
4
Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159 (1879); Campbell v. American
Zylonite Co., 122 N. Y. 455, 25 N. E. 853 (1890).
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incorporation is most frequent because most ardently sought, the
widest powers in the majority to amend, merge, sell, and alter the
financial structure and the characteristics of outstanding stock
were written into the statutes.5
But it was also realized that it was necessary to afford some relief
to dissenters; that, though a small group should not be able to
prevent the majority from doing with the corporation what they
thought wise, yet the minority should not be forced to continue
in an enterprise radically different from the venture on which they
originally embarked, or in an essentially altered status. The result
in most jurisdictions, was a compromise conferring on the dissenters
the right to receive the cash value of their stock and providing for an
6
appraisal where no agreement could be reached.
The statutes of the various states are unlike in scope. New York
has elaborate provisions for dissenters, and confers this right to
appraisal and payment in more situations than do most states. The
instances are: the sale of the corporation's property;7 consolida5

As illustrations see N. Y. CONS. LAws, c. 59 (STocK CORP. LAW) §§ 20, 38,
86; DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW (1929) §§ 26, 64a, 59, 39; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby,
1924) §§ 29, 45, 33, 94. The corporation laws of the different states are conveniently collected in PARKER, CORPORATION MANUAL (30th ed. 1929).

The effect of these statutes on existing charters is a moot question, and is
considered in the article by Dodd, Dissenting Shareholders and Amendments to
CorporateCharters (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 584. For what is probably the
majority view, see Peters v. U. S. Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. II, 114 Atl. 598
(1921).

§ 3524; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) § 558; ILL. GEN.
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 156, § 46; N. Y. CONS. LAWS,
c. 59 (STocK CORP. LAW) §§ 2I, 87, 38(12), 105(9), 14; OHIO GEN. CORP ACT
(1929) §§ 8623-72; Ind. Laws 1929, p. 756, 757. The National Banking Act gives
CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1918)

CORP. ACT (I919) § 73;

dissenting shareholders similar relief in the case of a consolidation of banks.
12 U. S. C. A. § 33 (1927).
7
N. Y. CONS. LAws, c. 59 (STocK CORP. LAWS) § 21. In Matter of Timmis,
200 N. Y. 177, 93 N. E. 522 (1910), "sell and convey its property" was held to
include a sale of the calendar department of a general lithographing business, for
securities in another corporation and an additional sum in cash. Dissenters
were held entitled to payment because the company had parted with an important part of the enterprise, though it furnished a comparatively small fraction of the company's income. But the sale of one of a chain of drug stores was
held not to be included in the pection. Wattley v. Nat. Drug. Stores Co., 122
Misc. 533, 204 N. Y. Supp. 254 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd, 2o8 App. Div. 836, 204
N. Y. Supp. 956 (Ist Dept. 1929).
If the object of the corporation is to buy and sell property, such sale would be
in the regular course of business and would not entitle the dissenter to payment.
Keating v. Coleman, 214 App. Div. 668, 213 N. Y. Supp. 213 (2d Dept. 1925).
Similarly, if leasing its property is included as one of the corporate purposes.
Matter of Knaisch, 203 App. Div. 725, 197 N. Y. Supp. 116 (4th Dept. 1922).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
tion; 8 alteration in the preferences of outstanding shares; 9 issuance of
stock to employees ;1Oand sale of assets on voluntary dissolution for
securities in another corporation." Some states include the important situation of a fundamental change in the corporate objects
brought about by amendment;" or where there is an extension of
the term of corporate existence.' But most states limit the right to
cases of merger or consolidation.' 4
In most corporate charters the power "to sell, assign, transfer, convey, lease or
sublease real property" is provided for, whatever the nature of the company's
business. Such a provision is in the charter of the United Corporation, an investment company. This, however, would not defeat the right of a dissenter to payment upon a sale of the property, except where such sales are the primary object
of the enterprise. Matter of Erlanger, 237 N. Y. i59, 142 N. E. 571 (1923).
8
N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 59 (STOCK CORP. LAW) § 87.
9
1id.
§ 38(12) provides that the right shall exist if the change in the certifi-

cate "alters the preferential rights of any outstanding shares." In Dresser v.
Donner Steel Co., 247 N. Y. 553, 161 N. E. 179 (1928), the issuance of a new class
of stock having superior preferential rights to outstanding preferred stock was
held, by a divided court, not to entitle dissenting holders of the latter shares to
an appraisal and payment. The reason given was that the preferences in the
outstanding shares were not technically altered, though the value of the preferences was considerably changed to the prejudice of the holders.
The same court considered the problem again in In re Schaffer Stores Co.,
25o N. Y. 242, i65 N. E. 279 (1929). Here there were two classes of preferred
stock. The certificate was amended to retire both classes and substitute in their
place a single class of preferred stock similar to the old first preferred shares.
Dissenting holders of the old second preferred stock were held entitled to an
appraisal, the majority of the court finding a destruction of the technical preferences in the retirement of the old and the issuance of the new stock, although
the old preferences were preserved. The majority felt bound by the rule laid
down in the Dresser case, supra, that the alteration of technical preferences was
determinative; the dissenting judges were disinclined to grant the right to payment having denied it in the Dresser case where the dissenters were actually
prejudiced.
Other states require in addition to changes in the preferences that the holders
be prejudiced thereby. ORio GEN. CORP. ACT. (1929) § 8623-15.
Louisiana requires that the amendment change "the rights of the holders of
any outstanding shares" [LA. Bus. CORP. ACT (1928) § 52], thus presumably
including common stockholders when preferred stock is issued. To the same effect
is the UNnF. Bus. CORP. ACT, § 42 (I).
'ON. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 59 (STocK CORP. LAw) § 14. Illinois has a like provivision, Ill. Laws 1923, p. 282. See also N. J. Laws I92O, c. 175, § 2 (c); Calif. Laws,
1921, c. 34, § 3. See Fordham, Some Legal Aspects of Employee Stock-Purchase
Plans (x93o) 8 N. C. L. REv. I61, 165.
"N. Y. CONS. LAws, c. 59 (STOcK CORP. LAW) § 105 (9).

"LA.

Bus. CORP. ACT (1928) § 52; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 156, § 46; OHio
13
§ 8623-15.
LA. Bus. CORP. ACT (1928) § 52.

GEN. CORP. ACT (1929)
4

' These changes can be brought about in different ways in the various states.
In some a bare majority suffices; in others a greater number is necessary, and
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I
There are some cases which seem to be authority for the proposition that, even in the absence of statute, a dissenting stockholder
has the right to receive payment for his shares when the majority
effects fundamental changes.15 It is difficult to see on what principles other than some general notion of fairness such a result is
predicated. These courts seem to have extended this right to the,
minority as the price the majority must pay for the valuable privileges which the statutes have conferred upon them, as a form of
equitable relief against the new powers of the majority.
That there continue to be limitations on the powers of the majority
under existing statutes is clear. What they may do with the corporation and the stockholder's interest therein continues to be confined
by constitutional and equitable principles. Their power to change
the charter by amendment or to accept amendments offered by the
state is circumscribed. Where there was no reservation of the
power to "alter and amend" in the legislative grant,16 the power at
best extends to non-fundamental changes.' 7 It is considerably
for some changes even the assent of "non-voting" stock must be reckoned in
making up the requisite number.
Similar provisions for dissenting shareholders are provided for by the ITALIAN
COMMERCIAL CODE. Article 165 provides that minority stockholders opposing a
resolution which extends the duration of the corporation, or authorizes a fusion
or reclassification or increase in the capital stock, or changes the objects of the
enterprise, are entitled to retire by having their shares redeemed on the basis
of their value as shown by the balance sheet last accepted. KUHN, STUDY OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1912)

737. Moreover, for most important changes a

three-quarter quorum, with an affirmative vote of the majority of all the outstanding stock, is required. Instances are a dissolution prior to termination;
merger; extension of duration; decrease of capital stock; reclassification or increase of capital stock; changes in objects and amendments of articles. ITAL.
CoU. CODE. art I58; KUHN, loc. Cit. supra.
15
Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R., 3o Pa. 42 (1858); Barnett v. Philadelphia
Market Co., 218 Pa. 649, 67 Atl. 912 (1907); International & G.N.R.R. v. Bremaud, 53 Tex. 96 (188o). See also, Koehler v. St. Mary's Brewing Co., 228 Pa.
648, 77 Atl. ioi6 (191o); Treat v. Hubbard-Elliot Copper Co., 4 Alaska 497
(1912).

"6Banel v. Alton & Sang. R. R., 13 IUl. 504 (1851) (change in the location of a
railroad); Pacific R. R. v. Renshaw, I8 Mo. 210 (7853).
"In the absence of the reserved power "to alter, amend or repeal", the state
can not by statute passed after the creation of the corporation authorize a
majority to accept an amendment altering or extending the nature of the enterprise: Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. R., 18 N. J. Eq. 778, 90 Am. Dec. 57o
(1867); Dow v. Northern R. R., 67 N. H. 1, 36 Atl. 510 (1887); or permitting a
consolidation with another corporation: Clearwater v. Meredith, I Wall. 25
(U. S. 7863); or increasing the liability of stockholders to creditors of the corporation: Ireland v. Palestine, B.N.P., etc. Co., i9 Ohio St. 369 (1869).
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less curtailed when the state made such a reservation at the time
of incorporation and later conferred new powers on the majority. 18
' 8Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46, 21 Sup. Ct. 21 (1900) (permitting cumulative voting); Wright v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 193 U. S. 657, 24 Sup. Ct. 49 (1903)
(changing kind of insurance written); Randle v. Winona Coal Co., 206 Ala. 254,
89 So. 790 (1921); Morris v. Am. Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696
(1923); Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 Atl. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928); Durfee
v. Old Colony & F. R. R., 5 Allen 230 (Mass. 1862) (permitting the extension of
a railway); Somerville v. St. Louis M. & M. Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464
(1912) (changing non-assessable stock to assessable); Salt Lake Automobile Co.
v. Keith-Obrien Co., 45 Utah 218, 143 Pac. ioi5 (x914) (authorizing issue of
preferred stock taking precedence oyer prior issued preferred stock),
The following cases set forth limitations on the power of amendment: Ry. v.
Allerton, x8 Wall. 233 (U. S. 1873); Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 24 L. Ed. 357
(r887); Superior Water, Light & Power Co.v. City of Superior, 263 U. S. 125,
44 Sup. Ct. 82 (1923); Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. R., supra note 17;
Pronick v. Spirits Distributing Co., 58 N. J. Eq. 97, 42 AtI. 586 (1899) (reducing
the dividend rate on outstanding preferred stock); Lord v. Equitable Life Assur.
SOc., 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443 (I9O9) (stripping stock of voting rights); Garey
v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369 (1907) (making non-assessable
stock subject to calls).
There is a real conflict as to the effect of the reservation in the state of the power
to amend. Whether this means more than the power to, alter the contract between the state and the corporation is the moot point. Though it is held that a
subsequent statute enabling the amendment has the same effect as though that
power in the majority were originally written into the charter, the controversy
begins anew as to the limitations on such power, the argument being that property
rights which have arisen out of the contract between the shareholders inter sese
and which have "vested" cannot be destroyed either by the state or by the majority under legislative authorization. At opposite poles on this question, stand
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., supra, and Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. Int'l
Mercantile Marine Co., infra note 19.
The suggestion is made that, if there is a, provision for paying dissenters in
the proposed corporate plans or if they are given the right to demand payment,
the action under the amendment becomes less harsh and should lead the court
to permit the majority move "as a sort of eminent domain." (1928) 14 CORNELL
LAW QUARTERLY 85. The fallacy of this argument seems to be the need to resort
to the concept of eminent domain in situations where no public enterprise or
purpose is necessarily involved and where the rule is therefore inapplicable.
There remains the more fundamental question whether the reservation of
the power to alter and amend by the state should be limited to the relation
between the state and the corporation, and should not be extended to the incidents of the contractual agreement among the shareholders. The writer does
not intend to discuss this problem, which is largely bound up with conflicting
theories of the nature of the modem corporation. Which result we reach will
to a great extent depend on whether we continue to regard the "essence of corporation" as being a grant from the state, the historical Anglo-American view,
or whether we embrace the Continental notion that the corporation is a contractual institution under the supervision of the state. See Dodd, op. cit. supra
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And even where the charter originally provided for the right in the
majority to amend or change at will, equitable considerations of
fairness and the constitutional protection of contract rights still
hover in the background as guardians of the interests of minority
shareholders. 9
But these limitations will presumably be imposed to enjoin unauthorized or unfair actions, not to extend to dissatisfied members
the right to cash in their shares. If it is unjust for the minority
to find itself in a new enterprise or in a radically different position
in the old one, it is likewise unjust to force the dissenter to accept
the option of being bought out when no such provision was in his
contract with the other shareholders.20
The effect would be to
validate pushing him out if a cash sop be offered. Though this
may be done by a public corporation exercising the privilege of
eminent domain, 21 no such privilege extends in favor of ordinary
business corporations where no public use.is involved. 2 And further,
even if extending to him the right to payment will legitimate the
corporate change by satisfying due process, nevertheless the writer
fails to see how the dissenter may insist on this kind of relief as a
price for not contesting the change when the majority have made no
such provision for him.2s
note 5; BERLE, STUDIES IN CORPORATION FINANCE (1928) 23, et seg.; Putnam,
State Interference, under the Reservation Clause, with Contracts Between the Stockholders of Corporations (1929) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 487.
2gFor the extent of the power in the majority to amend when expressly provided for in the original charter, see: Peters v. U.S. Mtge. Co., 13 Del. Ch. ii,
114 Atl. 598 (1921); General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co.,
98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 Atl. 244 (1925); see also Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.,
supranote I8. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. I.
1929), noted in (i93o) 15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 279.
For the limitations on this power, see: Lonsdale Securities Co. v. Int'l Mercantile Marine Co., ioI N. J. Eq. 554, 139 Atl. 5o (1927); Kent v. Quicksilver Mining
Co., 78 N. Y. 159 (1879); BERLE, op. cit. supranote 18, at 47.

20In Natusch v. Irving, supranote 3, an injunction was granted by Lord Eldon
restraining a change in the nature of the business, notwithstanding an offer by
the company to pay the dissenting member his original contribution to the
enterprise, plus interest. See also Ashton v. Burbank, 2 Dill. 435 (U. S. C. C. D.
Minn. 1873).
2Black v. Delaware & R. R. Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 455 (1873); Spencer v.
Seaboard Air Line Co., 137 N. C. 107, 49 S. E. 96 (19o4).
21 Morris v. Eylton, 125 Ala. 263, 28 So. 513 (1899); see Jackson Co. v. Gardner
Ins. Co., 22o Fed. 113 (C. C. A. ist, 1912).
nEven where the corporation was a public service company, a statute authorizing consolidation under the "alteration and repeal" clause was upheld against
dissenting stockholders, though it made no provision for payment to them. Hale
v. Cheshire R. R., 16I Mass. 442, 37 N. E. 307 (1894).
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Where the amendment or change is unauthorized by the charter
or the statutes, no provision for paying dissenters should validate it.
And where the charter or statute permits the majority to override
the objections of dissenting members, the power should not entail,
in the absence of statutory provision therefor,2 the necessity of
buying up the shares of those who disapproved. And the majority
of the courts seem to have so held.2
This view is strengthened by the fact that most courts regard
this right as an additional one of the stockholder.2 6 Thus, if the
27
proceedings are irregular or unauthorized, they may be set aside.
2
8
Likewise, if the consolidation is fraudulent.
Moreover, the directors and majority must propose a merger or consolidation which is
fair and equitable, and "the stockholder cannot be required to exercise his option of surrendering his stock for compensation until
he has had an opportunity of joining in the consolidation under
terms and conditions which, as to him, are legal and equitable."2 9
24

By a recent amendment to the Maryland Code, Laws 1927, c. 581, § 36Y,
the right of dissenters to payment is expressly denied when the charter originally
gives the majority the power to sell, lease, or exchange all the corporate property.
Its effect is to limit the right to payment given by § 36 to cases where the charter
was later amended to confer the right to sell on the majority.
nNugent v. Board of Supervisors, i9 Wall. 241 (U. S. 1873); Jones v. MissouriEdison Elec. Co., 135 Fed. I53 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 19o5), s.c., 144 Fed. 765, 776
(C. C. A. 8th, 19o6); Mayfield v. Alton Ry. Gas & Elec. Co., 198 Ill.
528, 65
N. E. 100 (1902); Traer v. Lucas, 224 Iowa io7, 99 N. W. 290 (19o4); Germer
v. Triple State, 6o W. Va. 143, 54 S. E. 5o9 (19o6); Port Edward, etc. Ry. v.
Arpin, 80 Wis. 224, 49 N. W. 828 (189r); FLETCHE, CYcLOPEDIA OF CoRPoRATIONS (1918) §4798.
26
Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., supra note 25, Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass.
504, 113 N. E. 189 (x916); Bingham v. Savings Investment, etc. Co., 107 N. J.
Eq. 413, 138 Atl. 659 (1927); Kelly v. Mariposa Land & Mining Co., 4 Hun. 632
(N. Y. ist Dept. 1875); Langon v. Franklyn, 29 Abb. N. C. 102, 20 N. Y. Supp
404 (City Ct, 1892); Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262; 2O8
N. Y. Supp. 978 (Ist Dept. 19o8), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 535 (19o8); Lasenby v. Int'l
Cotton Mills Co., 174 App. Div. 906, 16o N. Y. Supp. i (Ist Dept. 1916); Winifree v. Riverside Cotton Mills, 13 Va. 717, 75 S.E. 309 (1912); Jones v. Rhea,
I3O Va. 345, 107 S. E. 814 (1921); Treat v. Hubbard-Elliot Copper Co., supra
note 15; ef. Wilson v. Waltham Watch Co., 293 Fed. 811 (D. Mass. 1923).
27Jones v. Rhea, supranote 26; Treat v. Hubbard-Elliot Copper Co., supranote
i5.
"Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., supra note 25; Tanner v. Lindell Ry.,
18o Mo. 1,79 S. W. 155 (1903).
29
Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 98, 67 AtI. 657, 668 (29o7).
But a stockholder who avails himself of the statute for an appraisal upon the
sale of the corporate assets can not attack the sale itself as fraudulent. Wall v.
Parrot Co., 244 U. S.407, 37 Sup. Ct. 609 (1927).
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The right to payment is regarded as an alternative one with the
right of going along on the new venture or preventing it if improper.
Payment is not regarded as validating unauthorized action; nor as
rendering constitutional acts which, in its absence, would be held
to violate due process. If payment were held to be the exclusive
right of a dissenter, it seems clear that, except in the cases where the
right of eminent domain exists, the provision would be unconstitutional as confiscatory. There is more in a share of stock than the
right to its cash value when the owner opposes majority plans.
II
The statutes are for the most part crudely drawn and have left in
their wake a host of problems. Even the elemental question as to
who are included in the class entitled to payment is not clearly
answered. Most of the statutes are based on the first English provision in the Companies Act of 1862,30 which conferred the right to
payment on stockholders who "did not vote in favor" of the change,
"expressed their dissent", and demanded payment. The phrase
"did not vote in favor", or its equivalent "not voting in favor",
appear in the majority of the statutes in this country. Some few
explicitly require that the stockholder must have "voted against
such action"'" to earn the right to be paid. In the latter states the
stockholder is afforded little relief, for the same statutes permit
disfranchising his stock. By the simple expedient of stripping his
shares of voting power, the stockholder is deprived of the right
to payment though he strongly objects to the majority plans. If
the majority action be not tainted with fraud or irregularity, the
dissenter must continue as a "partner" however unacceptable the
new enterprise may be.
In the other group of states, the statutes are ambiguous-"not
voting in favor" does not clearly define the class. One possible
interpretation is that the right applies only to those shareholders
who have the privilege of voting on the proposal and have either
voted against it or at least refrained from voting for it. But the
right to vote must be there. Else it might be argued why mention
"voting" if it were intended to include members who have no voting
32
rights.
3125 & 26 VICT. C. 89, § 162 (1862).
31
lndiana, Maine, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. See Abbot v. Waltham
Watch Co., 26o Mass. 81, 156 N. E. 897 (1927).
21n 1862 when the remedy was first afforded, non-voting shares were probably
unknown in England, and hence the problem never arose there nor was the statute
indefinite or troublesome on that score.
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Another, and it seems to the writer a more plausible, interpretation of "not voting in favor" would include all shareholders except
those who cast votes in favor of the change, regardless of voting
power. This view would seem to follow from those cases which
insist that these statutes be liberally construed in favor of dissentersn
and from the realization that the other interpretation considerably
emasculates the remedy by excluding the large class of non-voting
stock. The rationale of the provision being that a member should
not be forced to continue in an altered enterprise not acceptable
to him, his right to retire and be compensated should exist whether
or not his status was such that he could vote against the change.
In fact it would seem that his case for payment would be the strongest because he has no voice in the consideration of the proposed
plans and is powerless to prevent their consummation.
At any rate, the statutes are not clear in defining the class to which
they apply-a most essential part of every law. The difficulty can
be obviated by giving the right to payment to "all shareholders
except those who voted in favor of" the proposal and who dissent
and demand payment.4
3N. J. & H. H. Ry. & Ferry Co. v. American Elec. Works, 82 N. J. L. 391, 8I
Atl. 989 (1929). In Matter of Drosnes, 187 App. Div. 425, 175 N. Y. Supp. 628
(Ist Dept. I919) there was a defect in the proceedings to sell all the corporate
assets. It was held that a dissenter could waive the defect and demand payment
under the statute. Cf. Matter of Macdonald, 2o5 App. Div. 579, 19o N. Y. Supp.
873 (2d Dept. 1923).
14The Ohio Act (GEN. CoaP. AcT (1929) § 8623-14, as amended by laws of
1929), by conferring the right to vote on any amendment substantially changing
the purposes of the corporation on every class of stock irrespective of voting
power in other matters, and on all classes of stock proposed to be changed by an
increase or reduction in par value of issued shares, or changed from par to no
par, or prejudiced or altered in any other way, has solved the problem in another
way. In case of reorganization "all dissenting stockholders, whether or not
entitled to vote", are entitled to this relief under subsection 72 which provides
for payment to dissenting shareholders "who'shall not have voted in favor" of
the proposals. The 1927 Ohio Act expressly conferred the right in all cases to
non-voting dissenters.
In South Carolina in the case of a sale of assets, the right to an appraisal and
payment is given to "any stockholder not voting in favor". S. C. Laws 1926,
Act No. 599, § 2. In the case of a merger or consolidation, the right to payment
is in addition given "if any stockholder... not entitled to vote thereon shall...
object in writing." Laws 1925, Act. No. 169, § 3. The reason for enlarging the
class in the latter instance is not apparent, and it may be that the difference in
the language was not meant to have a correspondingly different effect.
The new Tennessee corporation act confers the right to payment upon nonvoting as well as voting dissenters. Tenn. Laws 1929, p. 261, ef. seg.
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Another question which arises is whether this right to payment
can be denied by express provision in the articles of incoporation
or in the by-laws. The statutes generally are silent on this point,
except as they prohibit the charter from contravening the laws of
the state. Thus the Delaware Corporation Law of 1929 permits
the certificate of incorporation to "contain any provision which the
incorporators may choose to insert for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation ... provided such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this state."35
The certificate may not be amended "to permit the insertion of
any matter not in conformity with the provisions" of the Act,3" but
are to "contain only such provisions as it would be lawful and proper
to insert in an original certificate of incorporation."3 7 Corporations
may "make by-laws not inconsistent with the laws of this State,"3 g
but every corporation shall be governed by the provisions and be
subject to the restrictions and liabilities in this chapter. Section 61
gives the right of appraisal and payment to dissatisfied stockholders
after a merger or consolidation. Would the withdrawal of the
right in the original charter or in a subsequent amendment be "inconsistent with the laws of the state"? The acts give no answer. 39
But in the case of a charter attempting to require a lesser vote for
the sale of assets to a foreign corporation than that provided for
in the statute, it was held that the provision was contrary to law,
and the rejection of the certificate of incorporation by the Secretary
40
of State was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals.
In England there are cases holding that the remedy is mandatory
and any attempt to contract it away by provision either in the original memorandum of association or in the articles is entirely ineffective.41 And in those jurisdictions where the right 'is regarded as
existing in equity regardless of statutory provision,4 presumably,
3

36

"Ibid. § 26.

38

1DEL. GEN. Coap. LAW (1929) § 5 (8).

39

Ibi. § 25.
bid. §2 (6).

The Ohio Legislature in 1929 amended the 1927 General Corporation Act,
expressly to permit the charter to take away the right to payment. The Act
now confers the remedy, "unless the articles otherwise provide ... " Section
8623-72. See also § 8623-z5 to the same effect.
'0People ex rel. Barney v. Whalen, 189 N. Y. 56o, 82 N. E. II31 (1907).
41
Payne v. The Cork Co., [igool I Ch. 3o8; Bisgood v. Henderson's Transvaal
Estates, Ltd., [1908] i Ch. 743; cf. Cotton v. Imperial, etc. Investment Co.,
[1892]3 Ch. 454. And unless provision is made to satisfy payment to a dissentient
member, an injunction will be granted restraining the liquidator from parting
with any of the assets. Re Hester and Co., 44 L. J. Ch.(N.s.) 757 (1875).
4
2Barnett v. Phila. Market Co., 218 Pa. 649, 67 Atl. 912 (1907).
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nothing in the charter or in the statutes, for that matter, can take
it away from the dissenter.
If a charter can by express provision exclude the right to payment,
this right can be negated not only by a provision at its inception,
but by a subsequent amendment as well. And a corporation to
evade the necessity of paying dissenters when an important change
is contemplated could amend its charter so that payment would be
precluded and then proceed with the merger or consolidation without
the perhaps disquieting requirement of paying cash to dissenters."
But again arguing the reasons behind these statutory provisions,
it would seem that the provisions for payment are mandatory and
cannot be taken away in the charter. It would be an idle gesture to
confer a right which can be rendered nugatory by the same group
against whose actions it was designed to protect the minority.
Here again there is need&for removing the ambiguity in the statutes.
III
Stilt other ambiguities abound. The statutes of many states which
restrict the, purchase by, a company of its own shares of stock out
of surplus 5 or otherwise restrict the reduction of capital stock,
4Aside from the question. of statutory interpretation, the problem will to
a certain extent be. bound up with the general, question of how. far the contract
between the shareholders, as evidenced by the charter, will be untrammeled by
equitable limitations.

BERLE, MATERIALS IN TiE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE

28. Is this right to payment so essential that to contractit away would be
so anti-social as to have the law impose an equitable restrlction. on the right so
to contract, as it does, for example in the case of the equity of redemption in a
mortgage? Probably not, for in a good number of states no such right to payment
exists at all.
4A possible hindrance to this device would be the fact that in some states
such an amendment of itself gives the right to payment, e.g. Louisiana. In most
states, however, it does not. In these latter, there might be some relief in equity
to set aside such a move. See Dodd, op. cit. supranote S.
(1929)

45

DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW (1929) § 28; N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 40 (PENAL LAW)
CONS. LAws, c. 59 (STocr CORP. LAW) § 38(5) prohibits
the reduction of capital stock when it will "reduce the actual value of its assets

§ 664(5). The N. Y.

to an amount less than the total amount of its debts and liabilities plus the
amount, as reduced, of its capital or issued capital stock."
In the absence of statutory, authorization, the jurisdictions are in conflict
as to the power of a corporation to purchase its own shares. In England and
in some of our states no such power is implied. Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App.
Cas. 409 (1887); Chicago R. R. v. Marsailles, 84 Ill. 643- (1877)- German Say.
Bk. v, Wulfekuhler, i9 Kan. 60 (1877); CooK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923)
§§ 309-312.

In such jurisdictions, the problem discussed below will have added

complications.
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suggest the possibility of a limitation on the right to payment. It
is generally provided that, when the corporation is to dissolve or
the capital stock is to be reduced formally, the debts must first be
paid or at least sufficient assets must be left for such debts before
the stockholders can share in the assets 6 But suppose the corporation votes to change the preferences in outstanding shares, or to
sell the property, and some of the members object. The same states
provide that they may demand payment. Does this mean that they
can demand cash whether or not there is sufficient surplus, or only
if there is sufficient surplus?
There are the ordinary canons of statutory interpretation to look
to for guidance. The provisions for payment being specific, they
may be regarded as exceptions to the general prohibition of purchasing shares out of capital. But this is no absolute rule of law and would
not be conclusive even if we could label the one specific and the
other general- The order in time of enactment will not be very
helpful because of the usual reenactment of both provisions in the
same codifications.
The provisions against a corporation's purchasing its own shares
out of capital are inserted for the protection of two groups-the
creditors and the remaining shareholders. The latter are safeguarded by keeping the original contributions to the enterprise
unimpaired for its further development, and by preserving the proportionate voting strength of the members; the former by keeping
intact a fund to look to for the payment of debts. Though it may
be that the provisions for paying dissenters were meant to qualify
the protection given to the other shareholders by the general prohibition against reduction of capital stock informally, yet it is less
probable that it was intended to permit the rights of creditors to
be jeopardized. The application of the familiar "trust fund" doctrine
would result in the continuing liability of the "paid-out shareholders" to creditors in the event that such payment rendered the corporation insolvent. 47 In cases of agreements by the corporation to
pay the dissenters, the courts wotild probably limit their validity
to situations where, after payment of the agreed price, the company
continues to be solvent.48 If the transaction were tainted with
fraud or attempted to defeat the rights of creditors, an injunction
46DEL. GEx.

47In

CoRP. LAW (1929) §§ 28,

i9.

Fed. 935 (D. N. J. 1919); Crandall v. Lincoln,
Am. Rep. 560 (1884); Commercial Nat. Bk. v. Burch, iW1 Ill.

re O'Gara & McGuire,

259

Conn. 73, 52
519, 31 N. E. 4ao (1892).
48In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); Atlanta Ass'n
v. Smith, 141 Wis. 377, 123 N. W. io6 (i9io).
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would issue or the sale would be set aside. 49 In a state like New York 0
where the purchase of shares out of capital is made a penal offense,
the directors might raise the objection in opposing the motion for
the appointment of appraisers. Hence it would seem that the
creditor's right to protection is paramount to the dissenter's right
to payment.
A variation of the problem is the extent of this limitation on the
right to payment. Must the capital remain unimpaired, or is it
enough that after payment to dissenters sufficient assets remain
5
to meet existing corporate debts? The 1929 Ohio Corporation Act, '
49In re S. P. Smith Lumber Co., 132 Fed. 618 (N. D. Tex. 19o4); Columbian
Bank's Est., 147 Pa. 422, 23 Atl. 625 (1892); Trevor v. Whitworth, supranote 45.
50N. Y. CONs. LAws, c. 40 (PENAL LAW) § 664(5). Although the New York
courts have found an implied power in a corporation to purchase its own stock,
they have recognized that the penal law limits that power. The effect of the
limitation on agreements to purchase its own shares has been considered in
Richards v. Wiener Co., 207 N.Y. 59, IOO N. E. 592 (1912) and again in Topken,
Loring & Schwartz Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 2o6, [63 N. E. 735 (1928). The
latter case seemed to settle the rule here, but adverse criticism has been levelled
against it: (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 356, (1929) 42 HARv. L. Rev. 829; and the
latest New York decision in Cross v. Beguelin, 226 App. Div. 349, 235 N. Y.
Supp. 336 (Ist Dept. 1929) seems to leave the matter in uncertainty once more.
See (1929) 15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY I08. For a good discussion of the general
problem, see Glenn, Treasury Stock (1929) 15 VA. L. REv. 625.
51
Section 8623-416. Maryland has a similar provision. MD. ANN. CODE
(Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 50. South Carolina's limitation is even more sweeping.
S. C. Laws 1926, Act No. 599, § 5, after making provision for paying dissenters
in the event of consolidation, states: "the liability of corporations ... or of stockholders or officers thereof, or the rights and remedies of the creditors thereof
or of persons doing or transacting business therewith, shall not in any way be
impaired or diminished by the consolidation of two or more such corporations
under the provisions hereof."
Since the purchase of a single share of dissentient stock, by decreasing the
creditor's security, increases the probability of non-payment, it pro tanto "impairs" his "rights and remedies" against the corporation. If this is the meaning
of the statute, it would nullify the remedy entirely. And since it probably is
not, the literal meaning of the statute cannot be resorted to, and the usefulness
of the provision is questionable. It does seem to impose on paid-out shareholders
a continuing liability to creditors in the event of ensuing insolvency.
Section 2 of the same act, which assesses the costs of appraisal against the
corporation, but provides that neither that sum nor the "amount of valuation
fixed" shall be paid out of the corporation assets "until all existing debts of the
corporation have been paid.. ." further restricts the dissenter's remedy, and
would seem to render section 5 entirely unnecessary; for, if payment is postponed until all eisting debts are paid, it is hard to see how creditors can be
injured, unless section 5 was meant to continue the paid-out stockholder's liability
to future creditors, which is unlikely. The absence of any statutory provision
in South Carolina regarding the power of a corporation to purchase its own shares
generally, completes the confusion.
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which is one of the few statutes expressly recognizing and providing
for the conflicting rights of creditors and dissenters, provides that:
"A corporation may purchase shares of any class issued by it ...
from shareholders who by reason of dissent are entitled to be paid
the fair cash value of their shares," but not when the result of such
purchase would be to make it reasonably probable that the corporation would be "unable to satisfy its obligations and liabilities". This
seems to be the proper solution of the problem and would probably
be reached in most jurisdictions even in the absence of such express
statutory provision. The creditors should be protected to the extent
of preventing the payment of dissenters when such payment would
render the corporation insolvent. It is doubtful whether creditors
should receive the protection which the New York law seems to
give them and the remaining stockholders against any reduction of
capital in apparent limitation on the right of dissenters to payment.
Strangely enough these problems seem never to have been raised by
the cases,52 but they are real enough to demand clarification in the
statutes.
Further, assuming some limitation on the power of a corporation
to purchase its own stock in order to pay dissenters, what is the effect?
Does it mean that the majority may go ahead with the changebe it a consolidation or an alteration in the preferences of outstanding shares-but that the dissenters cannot be paid? Or does it
follow that, since the dissenters cannot be paid because it would
impair the corporation's solvency or capital fund, the consolidation
or change in preferential rights cannot be consummated? Either
choice involves some elements of unfairness and lessens the utility
of the remedy as a compromise between majority and minority.
But if we assume that creditor's rights are paramount the dilemma
is real and we must make our choice.
It may be argued that the limitation should be upon the majority's
right to bring about the necessity for payment. This would necessitate that, as a condition to the change they seek to make, the majority
be required to keep the value of the corporate assets at least equal
to the amount of the debts. To do this it might be necessary for
the majority to make a further contribution to the capital of the
52
It may be that as a practical matter corporations will make provisions in
advance for creditors and dissenters to insure the consummation of their plans,
or failing, abandon them, so that situations where the rights of the majority,
dissentients, and creditors conflict may not frequently arise in the courts. But
the problem will be a weighty one in the corporate deliberations over the proposed changes which may bring about such conflicts, and the rights of the parties
in court if litigation should arise will influence the action agreed upon.
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company. This would be the price of the change, for originally
unanimity was required. The need was abolished only when provision for paying dissenters was made.- If such payment can not be
given, unanimity is again necessary..
It is more likely, however, that the courts will adopt the other
alternative, and if the limitation be found to exist, it will cut down
the dissenter's right to payment, not the majority's power to act.'
The tendency of the legislature being to. confer greater freedom of
action on corporate managements, such statutory construction would
not be amiss. For such a view it might be urged that in many
cases where a corporation is in bad straits a merger or reorganization
is necessary for recovery, and to prevent its consummation because
dissenters can not be taken care of would be to confer a potent
weapon for blackmail on unscrupulous objectors to beneficial corporate changes. On the other hand, it may be argued that, by
encouraging sufficient dissension and thereby creating a group large
enough to prevent payment by the corporation, the majority could
relieve itself of the need of paying any-an equally undesirable
corporate practice.
Whichever rule the policy of any particular state may lead
to,
the need exists for a rule to remove the present uncertainty.
There are other limitations on the dissenter's right to be paid
which merit brief mention. In England and in some of our states
it is expressly provided by statute that the stockholder loses his
right to payment if the majority disaffirms the project. 5 In New
York this fesult has been reached, unaided by anything in the statute.56 A corporation voting for a change may later find itself faced
with the prospect of paying for the shares of a large group of dissatis5If our conclusion that the right to payment is mandatory where there is a
statutory provision therefor and cannot be denied by the charter is valid, this
argument gains force.
rATHE UNIF. Bus. CORP. LAW, § 4Z (3) provides: "A shareholder shall not be
entitled to payment for his shares ... unless the value of the corporate assets
which would remain after such payment would be at least equal to the aggregate
amount of its debts and liabilities exclusive of capital stock." This resolves the
question against the stockholder, and would probably deny the right to all
dissenters even though there might be sufficient assets to pay some. The 1929
Tennessee Corporation Act has a like provision, § 38.
uCompanies Act (1929) § 234 (3); MD. ANN. CODn. (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 36;

OHIO GEN. CoRP. AcT (1929) § 8623-72.
SMatter of Millard, 221 App. Div. 13, 222

N. Y. Supp. 633 (ist Dept. 1927),
aff'd, 246 N. Y. 546, 159 N. E. 645 (1927); Matter of O'Hara, 133 Misc. 584, 23
N. Y. Supp. 6o (Sup. Ct. 1928).
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fled members. It should have the privilege of abandoning the
57

venture.

The statutory requirements of notice must be followed and the
dissent must be real.58 Acceptance of any of the gains of the change
will prevent the dissenter from cashing in his shares.5 9 Laches will
also bar him.6
In Louisiana,"' when the majority voting for the change is sufficiently large (8o% of the voting power), the dissenter is stripped
of his right to payment, probably on the theory that such small
minorities are objecting to harass the company or else that there is
wisdom in large majorities.
As has before been indicated,12 the dissenter's rights are greater
than that of being paid-the latter being but an additional right.
Unauthorized and fraudulent changes may be enjoined. If the sale
is to the majority itself so as to be in breach of the fiduciary relation,
the minority can recover the value of the property in the, hands of
the new company6' But it is probable that payment of the dissenters
will be held to be merely a, condition subsequent to making the
change valid," that the failure to provide for them will render the
transaction only voidable. This will probably be true even though
the'statutez generally provide only that the appraised value shall
be recoverable "as directed by the court",6 or else "as other debts
are by law collectible" ;66 for, the relief being in equity, the courts
5In Ohio, once the dissenter has demanded payment, he cannot withdraw
and go along in the changed enterprise without the consent of the board of
directors. Oio GEN. CoRe. Acz (1929) § 8623-72.
581n re Demerara Rubber Co. Ltd., [I913] I Ch. 331. The court held that the
notice of dissent must state not only that the shareholders dissent but also that
the liquidator must either abandon the project or else purchase the dissenter's
shares. But see In re London Bread Co., 62 L. T. (N. s.) 224 (i8go) to the effect
that the dissent may be informal. See also Wall v. Parrot Co., supranote 29.
"Wormser v. Metropolitan Street Ry., 184 N. Y. 83, 76 N. E. IO36 (igo6); but
see Treadwell v. United Verde Copper Co., 134 App. Div. 394, i19 N. Y. Supp. 112
(ist Dept. I909).

60Drake v. N. Y. Suburban Water Co.,

26 App. Div. 499, 5o N. Y. Supp. 826
1898); cf. Finch v. Warrior Cement Co., I4r Atl. 54 (Del. Ch. 1928).
'LA. Bus. CoRP. ACT (1928) § 52. The new ENGLISH COMPANIES ACT (1929)
§ I55 has a like provision.
62
Supra note 26.
SErvin v. Oregon Ry. and Nay. Co., 27 Fed. 625 (C. C. D. N. Y. 1886).
"The English statute expressly so provides. In re Hester Co., 44 L. J. Ch..
(N s.) 757 (1875). See also Homer& Co. v. Lawrence, 86 Misc. 95, 98, 149 N. Y.
Supp. 82, 84 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
"NewYork.
"Delaware. The ENGLiSH COM'AmEs ACT (1929) § 234 (4) provides that, if the
company elects to purchase the members' interest rather than abstain from the
(2d Dept.
6
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7
may and generally will provide means of assuring the payment.1
Though the statutes treat the obligation to pay the dissenters as
that of the corporation of which they are members, yet if the corporation has parted with its assets, the sum is collectible against
the other company,6 and in some cases the stockholders may be
given a lien on the transferred assets.69

IV
Probably the most important problem which arises is that of
valuing the stockholders' shares. The statutes make scant provision
regarding the value to be fixed, and the cases shed little light on
methods of valuation. It is not the purpose of this paper to go into
the fundamental and troublesome questions of valuation which
today are engaging the attention of courts, commissions, and legislatures alike. But to reach any conclusions as to the effectiveness
of the remedy we are considering, it is necessary to see how the
legislatures and courts h.ve treated the question.
The wording of the statutes is not uniform. Some states refer
merely to the "value" of the shares; others, the "fair cash value";
still others, the "fair value"; some, the "market value" or "full
market value". Except possibly where the market value is set as
the guide, the wording of the statutes will probably have little
effect on the determination of the price.7 0 The courts will seek the
"intrinsic value"-the proportionate share of the assets of the comdissolution, "the purchase money must be paid before the company is dissolved."
Schemes of reconstruction which fail to make provision for paying dissenters
will not be approved by the court. In re De La Rue & Co., 8r L. J. Ch. (N. s.) 59
(1911); In re General Motor Cab Co., [1913] 2 Ch. 377.

6
In some states the company must post a bond to insure the payment, e.g.
Maine. In Tennessee the corporation may elect to post a bond or else permit
the award to become a lien against its assets. See infra note 96.
68
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 3524; FLA. GEN. LAWS (1927) § 6564; Atlanta,

B. &A. R. R. v. Atlantic Coast LineR. R., 138 Ga. 353, 75 S. E. 468 (1912).
69
MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 36; ME. REv. STAT. (1916) c. 51,

§ 64. Some courts are unsympathetic to the idea of giving a lien on the transferred assets to the dissentients. In re Interborough Consolidated CO., 277 Fed.
455 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Kremer v. Public Drug Co., 41 S. D. 365; 17o N. W. 571
(I919).
70
In Matter of Dupignac, 123 Misc. 21, 2o4 N. Y. Supp. 273 (Surr. Ct. 1924),

"clear market value", "fair market value", and "cash value" were said to be
synonymous. That case, however, involved the question of the taxation of closely
held stock. Cf. Donald v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 729, 48
Atl. 771 (1901).
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pany including good will. 7 Many of the elements which go to make
up market value will not be considered. Such extrinsic factors as
artificial manipulation and speculation which go into making up
market value will not be weighted.72 But quaere whether the expectation of distribution of profits or the "contract position" of
different classes of stock as to earnings or liquidation, which so
largely determine the price on the market, should not be included
even in arriving at intrinsic value. 3
Where the market value is prescribed, some interesting problems
arise. Do the statutes mean to give effect to all the extrinsic factors
which may at any time give the stock a value entirely removed
from any basic considerations? Probably not, and hence the attempts to exclude such artificial factors by calling for the "fair" or
"full" market value. But the test for the "full market value" was
laid down by a recent New Jersey case 4 as the method a broker
hired to sell the stock would use, by considering what previous sales
between willing buyers and sellers brought-and not by its "intrinsic"
value. This method was likewise prescribed by the same court
75
for appraisal where the statute called for "fair market value".
The Ohio code expressly provides that, if the "full market value...
is abnormally enhanced or depressed by unfair combinations or by
7Good will is recognized as a legitimate item of value in which the dissenter
may share. Matter of Seaich, 17o App. Div. 686, 156 N. Y. Supp. 579 (ist Dept.
1915). The value of the good will is arrived at by multiplying the average annual
profits by a number which is not fixed, but is a question of fact determined by
the circumstances of the case. Van Au v. Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257,
no N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dept. 19o8). The interest on the capital and surplus
employed in the business must be deducted from the net profits. And the annual
profits used as the multiplicand must be average. Thus, in Matter of Erlanger,
237 N. Y. I59, i42 N. E. 571

(1923),

the appraisers refused to estimate good will

at a certain three years' net earnings because those were peak years, but took the
average for five years and found no profits and no good will at all. For an economic

analysis of the bases of good will, see COMMONs,
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OF

et seg.
nTierney v. United Pochahantas Coal Co., 89 W. Va. 402, 109 S. E. 339 (1921).
73
In Matter of Clark, 131 Misc. 151, 226 N. Y. Supp. 141 (Sup. Ct. 1927)
it is suggested that the right consists only in "an aliquot part of the assets".
The "contract position" of the shares will not be considered in the valuation.
In the main case on dissolution the dissenting preferred (as to dividends only)
shareholders were permitted to include in estimating their share of the assets,
surplus made up of sums which might have been declared as dividends in prior
years on common stock. Cf. Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. i56,
177, 42 Sup. Ct. 540, 547 (1921); North American Mining Co. v. Clarke, 4o Pa.
432 (i86I).
CAPITALISM (1924) 182,

74In re Morris Canal & Banking Co., 6 N. J. Adv. 987 (1928).
75
Pral v. U. S. Leather Co., 6 N. J.Misc. 967, 143 Atl. 382 (1928).
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an illegal monopoly or by any other wrongful act, other evidence
than the market sales at that time may be resorted to for the purpose
of showing the fair value of the stock",7 8 thus coming closer to the
criterion of intrinsic value.
Some statutes 7 specifically exclude as an element in value any
depreciation or appreciation in consequence of the consolidation
or merger, realizing that the change may produce a radical revision
of the share's value, "market" or "intrinsic".
Where the merger or what not has brought the prices up, the dissenter, if the stock has a ready market, will dispose of them without
resorting to his statutory remedy. It is only when the market price
goes down that the dissenter is likely to seek payment from the
corporation, and then only if he feels that the intrinsic value will
prove suffciently greater than what the shares can bring on the market to warrant the trouble of starting the necessary proceedings.
The remedy will largely be resorted to in the cases of companies
whose shares have no definite market, and where such is the case,
"market value" is to a great extent meaningless; for itwas probably
not the intention of the legislature to have the value determined by
what a forced sale would bring,78 or in the absence of sufficiently
numerous buyers and sellers and sales to make a "market".7 9 In
such cases therefore, intrinsic value is again likely to be the criterion
used.
Whatever the test prescribed in the statute, the problem of valuing
the shares will continue to be the hard one the question of judicial
72 Orno GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 9034. Illinois, however, provides that the
fair value shall be paid, but states that "'the value of such shares at such date
shall be their market value in case the stock of such corporation is listed upon any
exchange." Ill. Laws 1923, p. 282. Thus, all those factors which go to make up
stock exchange prices are included in determining the "fair value" of shares.
For a criticism of the market as a criterion of value, see Friday, An Extension
of Val-e Theory (1922) 36 Q. J. or EcoN. 197.
77R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) c. 248, § 56; 2 N. J. CoMP. STAT. (1910) §§ io8, io8a.
MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 36. The New Jersey cases, supra notes
74, 75, say that in arriving at the "full market value" previous sales are to be
considered. The statutes call for the exclusion of fluctuations in value brought
about by the merger or consolidation. Prices of actively traded stock are frequently affected by premature rumors of negotiations for mergers, and the effect
of such mergers are discounted in the market price long in advance of the consummation of the change. The task of the appraisers in arriving at the market
value-evidenced presumably by public sales-which is free from the effects
of the merger or consolidation will not be a light one.
7
Jackson Co. v. Gardner Investment Co., 22o Fed. 113 (C. C. A. Ist, 1912);
Matter of Dupignac, supra note 70.
79See Int'l, etc. R. R. v. Bremond, 53 Tex. 96, 120 (1880).
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valuation always is.80 Calling for "fair value" and then leaving
the exigencies of each case in the hands of the appraisers under
supervision of the court is likely to work better than any legislative
attempt to prescribe a general rule at once restrictive and yet too
vague to be anything but troublesome.,

During the period from the time of dissent until the final order,
the status of the shareholder is ambiguous. Since the statutes of
many states provide for the valuation as of the date of dissent, his
rights as a stockholder would be in abeyance from that time, since
he would not be affected by any change in value during that period.
However, he does not lose his status as a stockholder for all purposes
until he is paid and surrenders his stock. In Florida and South
Carolina, however, he does.8 2
The allocation of costs in these proceedings is likely to be one of
the most potent factors in determining the efficacy of the remedy.
Appraisal of any considerable property will be a costly proceeding,
as a glance at some of the records of the litigated cases will show.
In New York and a few other states the costs are taxed against the
corporation. 8' In Florida they are equally divided between the shareholder and the corporation unless the corporation shall have offered
to pay the dissenter a lesser sum than the amount awarded, in which
case the entire costs are levied against the corporation. 4 Louisiana
penalizes with costs that party whose contention as to the value
of the share was overruled by the award.8 5 Ohio leaves the matter
to the discretion of the court; 6 England to the judgment of the arbi80

Bonbright, The Problem of Judicial Valuation (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 493.
Most of the statutes are silent about interest. Ohio leaves the date from which
interest shall be computed in the discretion of the court when it renders judgment. Illinois allows interest from the date the change was consummated. In
New York, though there is no statutory provision, the Court of Appeals has held
that the dissenter is entitled to interest from the date of the court order, not from
the time of the appraisers' report. Matter of Erlanger, supra note 71, distinguishing Matter of Seaich, supra note 71, which seemed to have awarded interest
from the date of dissent, and Matter of Task v. Peekskill Plow Works, 6 Hun 236
(N. Y. 1st Dept. 1875), which computed interest from the time of the report by
the appraisers. The court in the Erlanger case held that the award of the appraisers was not a final order until confirmed or modified by the court and interest
should run only from that time. In England interest runs only from the date
when the amount awarded is demanded and not from the date of dissent. In re
U. S. Direct Cable Co., 48 L. J. Ch. (N. s.) 665 (1879).
81FLA. GEN. LAWS (1927) § 6564; S. C. Laws 1926, Act No. 599.
8*ndiana, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.
S4FLA. GEN. LAWS (1927) § 6564.
uLA. Bus. CORP. AcT (1928) §§ 52-54.
81Omo GEN. CORP. AcT (1929) § 8623-72.
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trators.8 7 What the costs shall include is not clear. Presumably
the remuneration of the appraisers and the incidentals of the appraisal
are included. In some states reasonable attorney's fees are expressly
covered. 88 But what other items may be added? Do the costs include the expense of the dissenter's accountants, or of preliminary
appraisers to advise him whether the corporation is making him a
fair offer before he appeals for arbitration? Does it include the expense of his expert witnesses before the appraisers?89 Whether or
not such items can be charged in the costs will be important in determining whether arbitration should be resorted to for comparatively
small differences between the prices asked and offered.
The arbitrary assessment of costs against either side is inadvisable
as it gives the other side the upper hand in negotiations. Likewise,
making the costs depend on whether the final amount awarded is
greater or less than the sum offered by the corporation or asked by
dissenter is unfair, as it might make this large item depend on a
slight variation and would not take into account any honest difference of opinion. Leaving the matter of costs entirely in the discretion of the court seems the best solution, since it would probably
be administered to tax the unreasonable party in the transaction
or be divided when the diagreement was honest. This arrangement
would encourage both parties to attempt an extrajudicial settlement. The unreasonable party would not be likely to look with
favor on the prospect of resorting to appraisal proceedings, and
the other party would have little to fear if such proceedings became
necessary to fix a fair price.
878 & 9 VICT. c. I6 (1845), known as the Companies
88
South Carolina, Minnesota, and Florida.
89

Clauses Consolidation Act.

N. Y. C. P. A. § 1518 provides what the bill of costs of an arbitration may
include. Such items are legal fees of witnesses, referees, and other officers; fees
for publication, for printing papers, and "such other reasonable and necessary
expenses as are taxable according to the course and practice of the court or by
expression of law." Although the English statute makes the appraisal proceedings subject to all the rules regarding arbitration, the New York statute gives no
indication whether the same is true here, and the above section may not be applicable.
N. Y. C. P. A. § 1545 fixes referees' fees at $io per day, but this is generally
altered by stipulation.
In Int'l Fastener Co. v. Francis Mfg. Co., 204 App. Div. 526, 198 N. Y. Supp.
455 (4th Dept. 1923), it was held that the charge for the services of an expert
accountant, chosen by the referee for the plaintiff in an arbitration to examine the
defendant's books, could not be included in the bill of costs.

RIGHTS OF DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS
CONCLUSIONS

A comparative study of the various statutes and cases leaves one
with the definite notion that changes are advisable in order to make
the remedy complete.90 Of course it is first necessary to decide whether
the right is one which ought to be granted. But assuming the wisdom of the provision as a just and workable compromise between
the conflicting aims of the majority and minority, the need is for a
remedy which will be effective. Any such study is incomplete
without full statistics of the frequency with which corporations
undergo such changes as will require paying dissenters, how often
dissenters exercise this right, and how frequently they must resort
to the statutory appraisal to obtain a fair price. Such statistics
are unfortunately unavailable. But we do know that mergers,
consolidations, and reorganizations are of frequent occurrence of
late, and that the situations in which this remedy was meant to
apply will be numerous.
90

The provisions of the Uniform Business Corporation Law are set forth here
to illustrate a suggested model statute on the subject:
SECTION 42. Rights of a Shareholder Not Assenting to Certain Corporate
Action.
I. If a corporation has authorized the sale, lease or exchange of all its
assets ... at a time when it is able to meet its liabilities then matured,
or has ... authorized an amendment which changes the corporate purposes,
extends the duration of the corporation or changes the rights of the holders
of any outstanding shares, a shareholder who did not vote in favor of such
corporate action may, within 2o days after the date upon which such action
was authorized, object thereto in writing and demand payment for his shares.
2. If, after such a demand by a shareholder, the corporation and the
shareholder cannot agree upon the value of the shares at the time such
corporate action was authorized, such value shall' be ascertained by three
disinterested persons, one of whom shall be named by the shareholder,
another by the corporation and th6 third by the two thus chosen. The
finding of the appraisers shall be final, and if their award is not paid by the
corporation within 30 days after it is made, it may be recovered in an action
by the shareholder against the corporation. Upon payment by the corporation to the shareholder of the agreed or awarded price of his shares, the
shareholder shall forthwith transfer and assign the shares held by him at,
and in accordance with, the request of the corporation.
3. A shareholder shall not be entitled to payment for his shares under the
provisions of this Section unless the value of the corporate assets which would
remain after such payment would be at least equal to the aggregate amount
of the debts and liabilities exclusive of capital stock.
Section 48 provides that the right shall attach in case of a merger or consolidation, and "the liability.., to such dissenting shareholder for the value of his
shares so agreed upon or awarded shall also be a liability of the surviving or new
corporation, as the case may be."
The silence of the statute on the question of costs, and the finality of the appraisers' findings intimate that costs will be in the discretion of the appraisers
or, at any rate, in the discretion of the court.
It will be observed from the remainder of the text that the writer believes
certain changes and additions advisable in the foregoing suggested statute.
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First among the problems will be that of deciding in which situations the dissenter shall be given the right to be paid. Most states
are agreed that the right should exist in cases of merger or consolidation, and for the same reasons, in the case of a transfer of all the
assets. 9 Any fundamental alteration in the nature of the enterprise
by an amendment of the charter would likewise seem an appropriate
occasion for relieving dissatisfied members of the necessity of continuing in the venture. Changing the rights of outstanding stock
and thus altering the status of the shareholder to his prejudice
should give to anyone who is hurt thereby the privilege of withdrawing.92 And since the reduction of the capital stock alters the
position of the remaining shareholders in the enterprise, a dissenter
should enjoy the right to payment.
As has been indicated before, the right should not be dependent
on the power to vote, but should extend to all those who dissent
from the proposed changes; else the remedy will be considerably
emasculated and will be unavailing to those who most need itdisfranchised shareholders.
The powers of the minority in the usual corporation of today
are sufficiently meagre to make them deserving of these provisions
as of right, and they should be a mandatory part of every charter.
Especially in those articles of incorporation where the draftsmen
seek to give the most sweeping powers to the managing groups
and presumably would attempt to negate these rights by express
provision, should the right exist, as the dissenters will have little
say in the consummation of any changes. It is true that to that
extent we would be curtailing the freedom to contract, but where
sufficient social benefit results therefrom, the thought should not be a
bugaboo. And we have assumed the wisdom of the remedy.
The question of reconciling the conflicting interests of the creditors
and the majority and minority stockholders will prove troublesome.
There should be little doubt that the creditor's rights ought not to
be jeopardized; but it is probably enough to provide that after pay91

These statutory remedies, it seems, have not altered the common law rule
that a majority can dispose of the assets of a company which is either insolvent
or has ceased to do business. In such cases moreover dissenters have no right to
be paid. Weingreen v. Michelbacher, 163 App. Div. 95o, 149 N. Y. Supp. IIo
(Ist Dept. 1914); Matter of MacDonald, 2o5 App. Div. 579, i99 N. Y. Supp. 873
(2d Dept. 1923).
9Missouri grants the right to payment in the sole instance of an amendment
which authorizes the issuance of non par shares in exchange for existing shares
with par value (Mo. Laws 1923, p. 362, § 2) apparently without regard to whether
the shareholders are prejudiced thereby.
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ing the dissenters the remaining assets be at least equal to the aggregate amount of its debts and liabilities exclusive of capital stock,
or to adopt the more general Ohio provision against resulting probability that the corporation will be unable to satisfy its debts9 3 The
New York limitation against any impairment of capital seems too
drastic. Whether this limitation shall be upon the majority's right
to proceed with the change or upon the dissenter's right to be paid
is a question which will largely depend on the location of one's
sympathies generally in cases where the interests of majority and
minority shareholders collide. It is the belief of the writer (though
he suspects it will not be the opinion of most legislators or lawyers)
that the limitation should be upon the power of the corporate managers to make the change. The majority should be permitted to bring
about a situation which normally calls for payment to dissenters
only when they can make such payment without hurting creditors.
The question of costs of the appraisal is likely to be one of the most
important elements in the effectiveness of the remedy. As has been
pointed out, arbitrarily to tax such costs against the corporation
might encourage objecting stockholders to use the remedy for blackmailing the corporation with unreasonable demands. To levy them
against the stockholders would have a similar opposite effect. To
make the allocation always dependent on whether the appraiser's
figure was more or less than that offered by the corporation would
be arbitrary, and might result in the assessment of a large sum
against it for a slight variation in a case where their offer was fair
and made in good faith. Leaving the power to affix and assess the
costs of the proceedings, including reasonable attorney's and accountant's fees, in the discretion of the court is better than any fixed
94
rule.
Ample provision should exist in each state to assure that the dissenters will be paid the sum awarded. The transaction should not
9N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 40 (PENAL LAW) § 664 apparently restricts the remedy
to cases where dissenters can be paid out of surplus without any impairment of
capital at all. But N. Y. CONS. LAWS, c. 59 (STocK CORP. LAW) § 38(5) seems
to permit the reduction of capital stock to the point where its assets equal its
debts and liabilities "plus the amount, as reduced, of its capital or issued capital
stock". This section should prevail over the more rigid restriction of the penal
law. What the New York courts will do when these conflicting provisions are
squarely before them is largely conjectural, but it is submitted that the penal
provision is unnecessarily restrictive.
It has been held that a corporation can pay salaries to officers out of capital.
Hunter v. Conrad, 132 Misc. 579, 23o N. Y. Supp. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
This has been the English practice ever since the first statute was passed in
1862. The Ohio Code has a similar provision: Omo GEN. CORP. AcT (1929)
§8623-17.
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be held up pending the appraisal but some security might be required as is the case in Maine.95 The exact nature of this administrative detail should depend on the particular practice in the state."8
Of course the right should be an additional one to all the other
rights of the stockholder. It should not validate unauthorized or
fraudulent transactions, nor prevent the shareholder, though he has
objected to the proposed change, from electing to abide by it and
continue in the enterprise as then altered.
Amplified and made definite, it is believed that the remedy is a
workable compromise of the internal conflicts in the modern dynamic
corporation.
Although the dissenter will have a difficult time
deciding whether the sum offered by the corporation for his shares
is a fair one,"7 and may yield in many cases rather than resort to arbitration and the possibility of subsequent court proceedings, yet
if he feels that the offer is sufficiently inadequate and that his expenses may be paid by the corporation if he proves his case, the
remedy is as effective as are most legal remedies. The trouble and
the question of costs will loom on both sides as a deterrent to resort-.
ing to the statutory proceedings and will smooth over the gap caused
by minor variations in the sums asked and offered. The corporation
will not be anxious to have its accounts made public by the proceedings, nor risk the possibility that the dissenter will seek for some flaw
to enjoin the consummation of its plans. The existence of the remedy,
potent if necessarily resorted to, will probably have for its effect a
peaceful settlement of many intra-corporate dissensions.
95

MIE. R v. STAT. (1916) C. 51, § 63.
The new Tennessee Corporation Act gives the corporation which is selling
its property and has dissenters to care for, the option of having a decree entered
against it for the appraised value which will be a lien on the property, or of posting a bond for double the probable value of the shares. Tenn. Laws 1929, § 38,
p. 261, et seg.
97
It has been held in England that a dissentient member has no right to examine
the books of a company, in liquidation for the purpose of reconstruction, in order
that he may test the advisability of accepting the oger made for the shares or go
to arbitration. In re Glanorganshire Banking Co., 28 Oh. D. 620 (1884). However, in view of the general position in this country that stockholders have access
to the corporate records, at least for any honest purpose, the English case will
find little support here. Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass. 239, 8o N. E. 524 (19o6);
Henry v. Babcock-Wilcox Co., 196 N. Y. 302, 89 N. E. 942 (19o9). Moreover,
it is probable that in addition to the right to payment the dissenter has the right
to an accounting to see whether the proposed change is a fair one and to determine
which one of his alternative remedies he should resort to. Logan v. N. Y. Sugar
Refining Co., 176 App. Div. 66o, 163 N. Y. Supp. 214 (2d Dept. 1917).
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